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Abstract
We examine 220 estimates of the present-bias parameter from 28 articles using the Convex
Time Budget protocol. The literature shows that people are on average present biased, but
the estimates exhibit substantial heterogeneity across studies. There is evidence of modest
selective reporting in the direction of overreporting present-bias. The primary source of the
heterogeneity is the type of reward, either monetary or non-monetary reward, but the e￿ect
is weakened after correcting for potential selective reporting. In the studies using the mone-
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1 Introduction
Most choices create bene￿ts and costs that occur at di￿erent points in time. Domains of these
intertemporal choices include health (e.g., eating and exercise), ￿nancial decision making (e.g.,
saving for retirement), pursuit of education, household decisions, and more. In many of these
domains, introspection and experimental evidence suggest that people often exhibit present bias:
people prefer a smaller immediate reward to a larger delayed reward in the present, but they
reverse their preferenceswhen these two alternatives are shifted to the future by the same amount
of time. Understanding how and why people make such present-biased choices in many domains
informs design of government policy, corporate practices, and clinical practices.
The quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility model (QHD; Laibson, 1997; Phelps and Pollak, 1968),
also known as the present-biased preferences model, is an extension of the exponentially dis-
counted utility model (EDU; Koopmans, 1960; Samuelson, 1937). It is designed to capture dy-
namically inconsistent choices while retaining some of the tractability of EDU. In QHD, an agent
values a consumption stream (x0, . . . ,xT ) according to
U (x0, . . . ,xT ) = u(x0) +  
T’
t=1
  tu(xt ), (1)
where   > 0 is a traditional discount factor and   > 0 captures present-bias. Note that the
utilities from “future” periods (t   1) are exponentially weighted as in the standard EDU, while
this stream of future utilities is also discounted by   . Note that QHD includes EDU as a special
case when   = 1 (there is no present-bias). QHD is the most widely used representation of
present-biased preferences, although other functional forms (particularly variants of hyperbolic
discounting) will exhibit present-bias too.1
In this paper, we assemble all empirical estimates of present-biased preferences measured
with the experimental method called the Convex Time Budget (CTB; Andreoni and Sprenger,
2012) and meta-analyze those data. The meta-analysis gives tentative answers to four questions.
(i) What is an average value of  ? (ii) Is there selective reporting or publication bias? (iii) How
does   vary reliably with types of rewards, subject population, estimation methods, etc.? (iv)
How much will more data change these answers?
Our meta-analysis collects 220 estimates of the present-bias parameter in the QHD model ( 
in equation (1); hereafter PB) from 31 studies reported in 28 articles included in the dataset. To
1See, for example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), Gruber and Kőszegi (2001), Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010),
and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) for applications of (naïve) present-biased preferences and O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2015) for a short overview.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 1: Funnel plot of estimates of present bias parameter (PB). The  -axis (precision; inverse standard
error) is presented in the log-scale. The dotted curves indicate the boundaries for rejection of the null
hypothesis of no present bias (PB = 1; vertical grey line) for a two-sided test at the 5% signi￿cance level.
give a quick preview, the distribution of estimates and the relation with their associated standard
errors is presented in the “funnel plot” in Figure 1. A signi￿cant proportion of estimated PB’s are
smaller than one, indicating present bias rather than future bias. The dotted curves indicate the
boundaries for rejection of the null hypothesis of no present bias (PB = 1) for a two-sided test at
the 5% signi￿cance level; estimates outside the boundaries are rejections). The ￿gure shows that
many studies did not ￿nd strong evidence to reject the null of PB = 1, but those that do reject the
null hypothesis show present bias rather than future bias.
Whilemeta-analysis is indeed amethod, the contribution of our paper is not primarilymethod-
ological. Our contribution is substantive because it presents the best available estimates of PB,
and howmuch they vary. This evidence should be useful to many empirical economists for whom
a PB has been applied, including in household ￿nance (e.g., Angeletos et al., 2001; Beshears et al.,
2017; Meier and Sprenger, 2010), health decisions (Fang and Wang, 2015), labor contracts (Bisin
and Hyndman, 2018; Kaur et al., 2010, 2015), demand for commitment devices (Ashraf et al., 2006;
Beshears et al., 2015; John, forthcoming), and others.
Meta-analysis presumes that along with conventional “narrative” reviews, it is useful to com-
pile studies using speci￿c inclusion criteria, and compare numbers measured in di￿erent studies.
It hardly bears mentioning that even in the presence of quantitative meta-analyses, narrative re-
views will always be useful. They allow insightful commentary on which studies authors believe
are particularly interesting, diagnostic, or deserving of replication and extension, in a way that
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meta-analysis does not easily permit.
At the same time, narrative reviews do not typically specify inclusion criteria and usually
do not compare study results on one or more quantitative metrics. As a result, until a meta-
analysis such as ours, it is fair to say that even the most expert scholars are not fully aware
of what all existing studies have to say about the numerical size and variation in PB. Meta-
analysis goes further by compiling accessible cross-study data (which others can re-analyze),
establishing central tendency of numerical estimations, exploring cross-study moderators which
a￿ect estimates, and testing for various kinds of publication bias.
Meta-analysis is designed to accumulate scienti￿c knowledge, and also detect nonrandom re-
porting or publication of estimates that deviate from the average. Since it was ￿rst introduced
by Glass (1976), meta-analysis has been playing an important role in evidence-based practices in
medicine and policy (Gurevitch et al., 2018). However, meta-analysis has been less common in
economics until recently (Stanley, 2001).2 The current study is the ￿rst systematic meta-analysis
on the structural estimation of present bias in QHD, focusing speci￿cally on empirical approaches
based on the CTB protocol.Prominent reviews of evidence about intertemporal choices and PB
include the classic piece by Frederick et al. (2002) andmore recent coverage by Cohen et al. (forth-
coming) and Ericson and Laibson (2019). These articles are narrative and do not provide system-
atic collection and analysis of empirical observations (they rather describe subsets of important
contributions and themes which emerge across studies).3
The next section explains how we construct the dataset. Section 3 describes observable char-
acteristics of the studies and variation in experimental design. Section 4 presents the results.
2 Data and Method
2.1 The Convex Time Budget Protocol
There is a large body of evidence on estimation of time preferences, including present-biased
preferences. Many experimental methods have been proposed in the literature, but here we fo-
cus on the method called the Convex Time Budget (CTB) introduced by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012).4
2See a list of relevant publications indexed on RePec at: https://ideas.repec.org/k/metaana.html.
3Cohen et al. (forthcoming) document the design characteristics of 222 empirical studies identi￿ed using Google
Scholar, but they do not analyze parameter estimates reported in these studies.
4An experimental design concept that is similar to the CTB is discussed in Cubitt and Read (2007).
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The main goal of this method is to elicit all the parameters of the QHD model—the discount
factor   , present bias   , and instantaneous utility functionu—in a single experimental instrument.
Subjects in a CTB experiment are asked to choose a “bundle” of rewards (xt ,xt+k) delivered at two
points in time (t , t + k), under an intertemporal budget constraint with a k-period gross interest
rate of 1 + r . By asking a series of allocation questions with varying (t , t + k) and 1 + r , one can
identify parameters of the QHD model. See more details in Online Appendix A.
The CTB protocol instantly became popular. The protocol has been applied not only in labo-
ratory experiments but also in ￿eld experiments in developing countries. As we describe below,
we have variation in several aspects of CTB design which we exploit in meta-regression analysis.
2.2 Identi￿cation and Selection of Relevant Studies
Every good meta-analysis starts by casting a wide net trying to identify all relevant studies. In
order to deliver an unbiased meta-analysis, it is important to make sure that identi￿cation and
selection of papers are guided by unambiguously de￿ned inclusion criteria. In our case, the main
criterion is to “include all articles that conducted experiments or surveys with the CTB protocol.”
We searched for both published and unpublished papers to have su￿cient sample size and to be
able to check indicators of publication bias and selective reporting.
We searched articles which employed the CTB protocol using Google Scholar, ￿rst by query-
ing papers that cited Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), Andreoni et al. (2015), and Augenblick et al.
(2015). We also searched for papers with the keyword ‘convex time budget’. These two sets of
searches, done on November 28 and December 15, 2017, returned a total of 738 results (including
overlaps), which we further narrowed down by examining the titles and the abstracts.
As mentioned above, we searched for any articles, both published and unpublished, which
conducted experiments or surveys involving the CTB protocol. Note that this broad inclusion
criterion keeps studies even if QHD parameters are not estimated. These studies do not contribute
to our main mata-analysis but still provide some additional information regarding how the CTB
protocol has been used in the literature. For this reason, we kept track of these studies without
estimates, too.
We performed the second-round search (using the same query) and updated the database in
the Fall of 2018. The ￿nal dataset includes 67 articles.5 Figure 2 illustrates our selection procedure.
Note that in keeping with good meta-analysis practice, our inclusion criteria speci￿cally
5Tables B.1 and B.2 in Online Appendix list all studies (and their basic design characteristics) in the dataset, split
by the existence of parameter estimates. Online Appendix D presents the full list of references.
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Initial search
– Google Scholar search: "convex time budget"
– Citing Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
– Citing Andreoni et al. (2015)
– Citing Augenblick et al. (2015)
Articles searched on the basis of abstract
Excluded papers ...
– Neither conduct a CTB experiment nor analyze
data from a CTB experiment
Read through of article and application of
inclusion criteria
Excluded papers ...
– Duplicates of another included study
– Neither conduct a CTB experiment nor analyze
data from a CTB experiment
Second-round search Final set of papers (n = 67)
n = 738
n = 97
n = 60
F￿￿￿￿￿ 2: Paper search and data construction.
exclude other studies which are informative about present bias. Narrative reviews are better
equipped to weave discoveries from such papers into a coherent conclusion. For example, Au-
genblick (2018) varies time of delivery of initial payments, and ￿nd a decay e￿ect in which a
few hours of delay reduces present bias substantially. There are many, many other papers in
economics, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience which are important but are not included
because they did not use CTB.6
2.3 Data Construction
After identifying relevant articles, we assembled the dataset by coding estimation results and
characteristics of the experimental design. We call a collection of estimates a “study” when they
are from the same experimental design. These two units of observations, an article and a study,
coincide in many cases, but it allows us to distinguish two conceptually di￿erent experiments
reported in a single paper (e.g., monetary reward and e￿ort-cost versions of CTB in Augenblick
et al., 2015).
6We are currently conducting a larger-scale meta-analysis using papers which estimate discounting parameters
using any method, extending the scope beyond CTB.
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Our primary variable of interest is the estimate of present-biasedness, but we also coded
other parameters in the QHDmodel (such as discount factor, utility curvature, and parameter for
stochastic choice, if available) as well. Studies report either aggregate-level parameter estimates
(i.e., pool choice data from all subjects and estimate a set of parameters for the “representative
subject”) or some summary statistics, such as the mean or median of individual-level estimates.
We coded these two types of estimate separately.7 We also coded standard errors of parameter
estimates from aggregate-level analysis in order to control simply for the quality of the study in
the meta-analysis reported below.
We also coded variables describing characteristics of experimental design and econometric
strategies. These variables include, among others: location of the experiments (e.g., laboratory,
￿eld, online); types of reward (e.g., real or hypothetical, money, e￿ort); delivery method (e.g.,
cash, check, gift card); subject pool (e.g., children, college student, general population); and so
on. Table B.4 in Online Appendix lists variables coded in the study. Some studies implemented
the CTB protocol with some treatment variations, such as hunger, cognitive resource depletion,
￿nancial education intervention, time pressure, and so on (Table B.3 in Online Appendix). We
coded a dummy variable for treatment. We call a study “neutral” if there is no treatment variation
(there is a single data set of experimental condition).
3 Features of Studies and Experimental Designs
We identi￿ed 67 articles that conducted experiments or surveys that used the CTB protocol or a
modi￿cation, where 36 of them are published (or “in press”) including nine articles published in
one of the “Top 5” journals (as of December 31, 2018). There are 41 articles that report structurally
estimated QHD parameters either at the aggregate level or at the individual level. The median
number of estimates reported in an article is three. Seven studies reportedmore than 10 estimates,
and two of them reported more than 30 (Table B.1 in Online Appendix).
Observable features of experimental design do not exhibit marked di￿erence between studies
with parameter estimates and those without (Tables 1 and 2; Figure C.6 in Online Appendix).
Roughly half of the studies report laboratory experiments. Online experiments constitute
7In our main meta-analysis below, we focus only on the aggregate-level estimates since there are not many
individual-level estimates and the reporting format is not common across these studies. More precisely, we identi￿ed
only 44 individual-level estimates from 10 studies. Six of these estimates are the mean of the distribution and the
other 38 are the median. The former six estimates are accompanied with the standard deviation of the distribution.
See Figure B.1 in Online Appendix.
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T￿￿￿￿ 1: Characteristics of CTB studies in the dataset.
All CTB studies Studies with estimates
Frequency Proportion (%) Frequency Proportion (%)
Total number of studies 67 100.0 36 100.0
Content of study
Report PB parameter estimates 36 53.7
Publication Status (as of 12/31/2018)
Published 36 53.7 17 47.2
Published in “Top 5” journal 9 13.4 3 8.3
Type of study
Lab experiment 29 43.3 15 41.7
Field experiment 27 40.3 14 38.9
Online experiment 10 14.9 6 16.7
Classroom 1 1.5 1 2.8
Geographic location
Continent: North America 22 32.8 13 36.1
Continent: Europe 13 19.4 8 22.2
Continent: Asia 17 25.4 9 25.0
Continent: Africa 11 16.4 5 13.9
Continent: Oceania 2 3.0 0 0.0
Continent: South America 2 3.0 1 2.8
Reporting of PB parameter estimates
Aggregate-level estimates 31 86.1
with standard errors 28 77.8
Individual-level estimates 10 27.8
Note: “Top 5 Journal” indicates that the paper is published (or “in press”) in one of the following journals: American
Economic Review; Econometrica; Journal of Political Economy; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Review of Economic
Studies. Reporting of parameter estimates: A paper is counted as reporting a particular type of estimate if it reports
at least one speci￿cation reporting the given type of estimate. Five additional studies reported estimates of EDU
parameters, not QHD (i.e., no PB parameter in the model).
fewer than 20% of the studies in the dataset. Only one experiment which studied choices made by
children in a classroom. Studies were conducted in 29 di￿erent countries as shown in Figure C.5,
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T￿￿￿￿ 2: Characteristics of CTB studies in the dataset.
All CTB studies Studies with estimates
Frequency Proportion (%) Frequency Proportion (%)
Total number of studies 67 36
Subject population
Kids and teens 7 10.4 1 2.8
Univ. students 28 41.8 15 41.7
General pop. 32 47.8 20 55.6
Reward type
Real incentive 65 97.0 34 94.4
Certain 63 94.0 36 100.0
Gains 59 88.1 29 80.6
Money 53 79.1 29 80.6
E￿ort 9 13.4 8 22.2
Reward delivery
Bank transfer 19 28.4 11 30.6
Pickup 5 7.5 3 8.3
Check 10 14.9 6 16.7
Cash 8 11.9 7 19.4
Paypal 2 3.0 2 5.6
CTB implementation
Corner allowed 58 86.6 30 83.3
Computer 28 41.8 19 52.8
Deal with confounding factors
Uncertainty of future payment 46 68.7 23 63.9
Equalize transaction cost 52 77.6 28 77.8
Note: A paper is counted as o￿ering a certain type of reward if it o￿ers the reward to at least one of the samples the
study analyzes.
although a third of studies analyzed data from the USA.8
8These 29 countries are: Afghanistan; Australia; China; Colombia; Ethiopia; France; Germany; Guatemala; India;
Italy; Japan; Kenya; Malawi; Mozambique; Nepal; Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Philippines; Singapore; South
9
Most of the studies recruited participants from the population of college/university students,
or a general population including retirees. It is important to note that several studies in our
sample estimated QHD parameters using non-monetary rewards (more precisely, using the cost
of working on tedious real-e￿ort tasks) following Augenblick et al. (2015) (and see Brown et al.
(2009) for earlier results with liquid primary reinforcers, not using CTB). Studies which used
monetary reward di￿ered in how future payments were made: some used bank transfer or sent
checks to the subjects, but in some other experiments subjects came back to the laboratory to
pick up the payments.
These observable study characteristics exhibit some patterns of co-occurrence (Figures C.7-
C.9 in Online Appendix). For example, laboratory experiments tended to have student subjects
while ￿eld studies are more likely to recruit from the general population.
Experimental elicitation of time preferences requires researchers to design experiments so
that the e￿ects of potential confounding factors are minimized. As discussed in the literature,
two notable examples of potential confounding factors are the uncertainty or distrust of future
payment and the di￿erences in transaction costs between receiving outcomes at earlier and later
dates (e.g., Cohen et al., forthcoming; Ericson and Laibson, 2019).9 Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
dealt with these issues using the following strategies: (i) they gave the experimental partici-
pants the business cards of the researcher (and told them to reach out if they did not receive the
payment) to increase trust; and (ii) they split the participation fee into two parts, one delivered
together with the “sooner payment” and the other delivered with the “later payment,” to reduce
the di￿erence in transaction costs of receiving rewards at two di￿erent points in time. Many of
the later studies in our sample also followed these strategies.
Let us now turn to the detail of the CTB protocol. There are several variables which re-
searchers can specify: number of budgets (i.e., questions); set of time frames (pairs (t ,k) of
“sooner” payment date t and delay length k); gross interest rates over k periods; and so on.
Table 3 summarizes the ranges and central tendencies of these design variables.
On average, researchers asked 22 questions to recover QHD parameters. Subjects made al-
location decisions on four di￿erent (t ,k) pairs on average, implying that each time frame was
associated on average with ￿ve levels of gross interest rates over k periods. The length of delay
Africa; Spain; Taiwan; Thailand; Turkey; Uganda; UK; USA; Vietnam.
9Our view is that both uncertainty about payment and transaction costs are minor factors which many previous
experiments have controlled e￿ectively, in the sense that they do not change estimates of PB by numerical amounts
which would give one pause in deciding whether PB should be investigated in applications. See Halevy (2014) for
similar skepticism.
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T￿￿￿￿ 3: Characteristics of budgets and time frames.
All CTB studies (60) Studies with estimates (38)
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
Number of budget sets 17.69 14.50 1.00 55 21.88 20.00 4.00 55
Number of time frames 3.18 2.00 1.00 10 3.78 3.00 1.00 10
Minimum delay length (days) 34.89 28.00 1.00 365 40.88 30.00 1.00 365
Maximum delay length (days) 166.40 32.50 1.00 7,300 236.85 56.00 1.00 7,300
Mean delay length (days) 90.72 30.00 1.00 3,285 123.95 42.00 1.00 3,285
between the “sooner” payment and the “later” payment varied substantially across studies. On
average, the minimumwaiting period is a little over one month and the maximumwaiting period
is six to eight months.
Finally, we look at the assumptions and econometric approaches employed to structurally
estimate QHD parameters (Table 4). There are 227 estimates in the dataset, and a signi￿cant ma-
jority assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) speci￿cation for the instantaneous utility
functionu in the model (1). The typical speci￿cation for studies using real-e￿ort tasks is a convex
e￿ort cost function. There are ￿ve observations where the utility curvature was either ￿xed at
some exogenous value or imputed from an additional elicitation task such as a multiple price list
(Holt and Laury, 2002).
The popular econometric approach is (two-limit) Tobit regression, since researchers need to
handle censoring due to corner choices. See Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Augenblick et al.
(2015) for a detailed explanation of identi￿cation and estimation using nonlinear least squares
(NLS) and Tobit approaches.
4 Results
Aggregate-level estimates of the present-bias parameter from each article in the dataset are shown
in Figure 3A. About 77% of these estimates are below one, indicating present bias. It is clear from
the ￿gure that these estimates vary not only between studies but also within each study. We
have 220 aggregate-level estimates with standard errors (Table 4). In this section, we ￿rst calcu-
late the “average” present bias parameter using the standard meta-analytic technique. We next
investigate the existence or absence of selective reporting. Finally, we investigate the heterogene-
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T￿￿￿￿ 4: Characteristics of aggregate-level PB estimates.
Frequency Proportion (%)
Number of estimates 227
SE reported 220 96.9
Instantaneous utility function u
Estimated 222 97.8
Imputed 2 0.9
Fixed 3 1.3
Speci￿cation of u
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 183 80.6
Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 15 6.6
Other 6 2.6
Convex e￿ort cost 22 9.7
Estimation method
OLS + NLS 62 27.3
Tobit 107 47.1
Multinomial logit + maximum likelihood 25 11.0
Background consumption
Fixed at zero 134 59.0
Fixed at non-zero value 70 30.8
Estimated 23 10.1
ity of observed estimates using the moderator variables coded in our dataset.
4.1 Meta-Analytic Synthesis of Present Bias Estimates
We start by providing a meta-analytic estimation of the “average” PB in the dataset. The analysis
below provides a tentative answer to the question: What is the average value of PB?
In a simple meta-analytic framework, the common-e￿ect model is
PBj = PB0 +  j , (2)
where PBj is the jth estimate of present-bias in the dataset (j = 1, . . . ,m), PB0 is the “true” present-
bias parameter that is assumed to be common to all observations in the data, and  j is the sampling
12
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 3: Present bias parameter estimates. The vertical dotted line indicates no present/future bias.
error. It is assumed that  j ⇠ N(0, 2j ) and the sampling variance  2j is known. We can obtain the
common-e￿ect estimate of PB0 as the weighted average of individual estimates:
PB0 =
Õm
j=1wjPBjÕm
j=1wj
,
where the weights are given by the inverse variance, wj = 1/ 2j . In this average, estimates with
higher precision (smaller standard errors) are given larger weights. If we assume that the sam-
pling variance is known only up to some unknownmultiplicative constant (i.e.,  2j =   ˜2j for some
  > 0), equation (2) becomes the unrestricted weighted least squares model (UWLS; Stanley and
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Doucouliagos, 2015).10
In the random-e￿ects meta-analysis (DerSimonian and Laird, 1986), we assume that
PBj = µj +  j = PB0 +  j +  j , (3)
where  j is a sampling error of PBj as an estimate of µj , and the estimate-speci￿c “true” e￿ect
µj is decomposed into PB0 (grand mean) and the sampling error  j . It is further assumed that
 j ⇠ N(0,  2), where   2 is the observation-speci￿c heterogeneity that must be estimated. Note
that the random-e￿ects model (3) reduces to the common-e￿ect model (2) when   2 = 0. Stanley
(2008) shows, using simulations, that the common-e￿ect approach is less biased in the presence
of selective reporting. The random-e￿ects estimates are presented in Online Appendix C.4.
Note that our dataset includes statistically dependent estimates of PB since many studies in-
cluded in our meta-analysis report multiple estimates from the same experiment (e.g., using dif-
ferent econometric approaches or using di￿erent subsamples). In order to account for the depen-
dency, we use cluster-robust variance estimation to account for correlation of estimates among
each study (Hedges et al., 2010).
We also address the issue of “overly in￿uential” observations (i.e., leverage points) by cal-
culating DFBETAS (Belsley et al., 1980), which measures how much the regression coe￿cient
changes if one observation is removed, standardized by the coe￿cient standard error from the
regression without the target observation. Following Bollen and Jackman (1985), we identify any
observations to be in￿uential if |DFBETAS | > 1 (i.e., the observation shifts the coe￿cient at least
one standard error).11 This procedure identi￿es three in￿uential observations in our data: one
estimate from Barcellos and Carvalho (2014) and two estimates from Liu et al. (2014). We remove
these three estimates from our simple meta-analysis presented in this subsection.12
We estimate the meta-analytic averages for four di￿erent subsets of the data: (i) all estimates,
(ii) observations from studies using monetary reward, (iii) observations from “neutral” studies
using monetary reward, and (iv) observations from studies using the real-e￿ort version of the
CTB.
10The common-e￿ect and the unrestricted weighted least squares models give the same weighted average PB0 but
their associated variances are di￿erent. The unknown constant   is given by the residual variance from the standard
weighted least squares.
11DFBETAS is intended to measure the impact of removing observationm on the kth coe￿cient. Let b k and b  (m)k
be the estimated kth coe￿cient with and without observationm, respectively. Then, the impact of observationm is
given by DFBETASm = (b k  b  (m)k )/SE(b  (m)k ), where SE(b  (m)k ) is the standard error ofb  (m)k .
12Online Appendix Section C.4 presents results with these three estimates included.
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T￿￿￿￿ 5: Meta-analytic average of present bias parameter.
All studies Monetary (all) Monetary (“neutral”) E￿ort cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB0 0.9941 0.9518 0.9943 0.9758 0.9964 0.9766 0.9072 0.8802
(0.0020) (0.0149) (0.0020) (0.0154) (0.0036) (0.0161) (0.0242) (0.0208)
p-value 0.0069 0.0031 0.0107 0.1334 0.3317 0.1640 0.0050 0.0004
Model UWLS Multi-level UWLS Multi-level UWLS Multi-level UWLS Multi-level
Observations 217 217 193 193 140 140 24 24
Studies 29 29 20 20 19 19 9 9
Note: p-values are from the two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 : PB = 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster-robust (Hedges et al., 2010). Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded.
Table 5 reports the ￿rst set of results (odd-numbered columns; also presented in Figure 3B).
All speci￿cations show PB0 < 1, indicating present bias, and the null hypothesis of no present
bias (i.e., H0 : PB = 1) is rejected at the conventional level of p = 0.05 in all but one subset of
the data. The overall PB0 is 0.99, which is signi￿cantly di￿erent from one at the 1% signi￿cance
level. The only estimate which is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from one (at the 5% level) comes
from the subset of observations from CTB studies using monetary reward without any treatment
variations. We observe smaller average PB0 in the real-e￿ort version of CTB studies compared to
the CTB studies using monetary reward.
As an alternative approach to handle dependent PB estimates, we also apply multi-level meta-
analysis (Konstantopoulos, 2011; Van denNoortgate et al., 2013).13 Let PBij denote the jth estimate
of PB parameter from study i . The ￿rst level is PBij = µij +  ij , where µij is the “true” present-bias
parameter and  ij ⇠ N(0, 2ij) for the jth estimate in study i . The second level is µij =  i +   (2)ij ,
where  i is the average present-biasedness in study i and   (2)ij ⇠ N(0,  2(2)). Finally, the third level
is  i = PB0+  (3)i , where PB0 is the population average of PB and  
(3)
i ⇠ N(0,  2(3)). These equations
are combined into a single model:
PBij = PB0 +  
(2)
ij +  
(3)
i +  ij .
13More precisely, we assume a “three-level” model structure. The common-e￿ect model (2) and the random-e￿ects
speci￿cation (3) described above can be seen as “two-level” models where the ￿rst level is PBj = µ j+ j and the second
levels are µ j = PB0 for the common-e￿ect model and µ j = PB0 +   j for the random-e￿ects model.
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A small value of   2(2) indicates that the estimates are similar at the study level (i.e., there is little
within-study variation of di￿erent estimates). A large   2(3) suggests that the “true” present-bias pa-
rameter varies a lot across studies. Under the typical assumption of Cov(  2(2),  2(3)) = Cov(  2(2),  ij) =
Cov(  2(3),  ij) = 0, we have E[PBij] = PB0.
In this multi-level speci￿cation, we ￿nd PB0’s that are smaller than the corresponding esti-
mates from UWLS approach (Table 5). The overall PB0 in the literature is about 0.95 (see col-
umn (2) of Table 5). The value 0.95 is therefore the tentative best guess of the overall value of
PB0. However, previewing results below, it also appears that PB0 is close to one for choices over
money, and is smaller, around 0.88-0.91, PB0 for choices over e￿ort (see columns (7) and (8) of
Table 5).
4.2 Identifying and Correcting for Selective Reporting
This section provides a tentative answer to our second question: Is there selective reporting or
publication bias?
Scienti￿c cumulation of knowledge is thrown o￿ track and slowed down by selective report-
ing or publication of results. The typical concern is when the sign or magnitude of a statistical
relationship is strongly predicted by theory, or becomes conventionally believed after prelimi-
nary studies. Then new studies which derive an unpredicted or unconventional result may be
underpublished. We will refer to this misproduction of results as “publication bias”. There are
several possible sources of publication bias. One is conscious fraud. Another is “p-hacking”,
in which multiple analyses are run to get the expected e￿ect (without accounting for multiple
comparisons during the speci￿cation search). A third sources is that scientists who discover a
genuine contradictory e￿ect (and do not p-hack their way out of it) may simply not report results
in any form, such as a conference presentation or preprint; the contradictory e￿ect ends up in a
“￿le drawer”. A fourth source is that even if scientists attempt to publish contradictory e￿ects,
journals may implicitly screen them out or encourage, in the review process, p-hacking.
For a single study it is very di￿cult to detect any of these kinds of publication bias (except
clumsy frauds). However, in a group of related studies there are ways to detect possible collective
publication bias.
The QHD model emerged to explain observed patterns of present-biased choices, including
procrastination and challenges self-control. Publication bias would therefore seem most likely to
exaggerate the number of studies estimating the present bias parameter to be signi￿cantly below
one, since an estimate of the present bias parameter below one is consistent with preferences
than could generate the observed pattern of present-biased choices that the QHDmodel is trying
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to capture.
The funnel plot provides a useful ￿rst step for detecting selective reporting (and counter-
factually correcting for it). Selective reporting will lead to “missing studies” which create an
asymmetry in the funnel plot. Figure 1 presents suggestive evidence of selective reporting—there
is a slight asymmetry even though the magnitude may not be huge (see also Online Appendix
Figures C.3 and C.4, which present funnel plots for monetary-CTB and e￿ort-CTB separately).
A common procedure for detecting and correcting for publication selection bias is the FAT-
PET-PEESE procedure (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, 2014).14 In the absence of selective re-
porting, the reported estimates of the present-bias parameter should be uncorrelated with their
standard errors. In the presence of selective reporting, on the other hand, the reported estimates
are correlated with their standard errors (more imprecise estimates in the unconventional di-
rection will go unreported). This motivates a simple regression model for detection of selective
reporting:
PBij =  0 +  1 · SEij +  ij , (4)
where PBij and SEij are again the jth estimates of the present-bias parameter and their associated
standard errors reported in the ith study. In this model,  1 , 0 captures the degree of selective
reporting bias. The estimate of  0 naturally serves as an estimate of the selection-corrected e￿ect
size (since it corresponds to an extrapolated e￿ect size with zero standard error and hence perfect
precision). Note that the variance of  ij in this regression will vary across estimates. Therefore,
it is often suggested to use weighted least squares (WLS) with the inverse of the variance of the
study’s estimate (1/SE2ij) as the weight (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). This model allows us
to test the asymmetry of the funnel plot (FAT; Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2005, 2008) as well as
whether there is a genuine e￿ect beyond publication selection (PET). See Stanley and Doucoulia-
gos (2012) and Stanley (2017) for discussion (especially on the limitations of these approaches).
Table 6 reports results from estimation of model (4) using the unrestricted weighted least
squares. We again exclude three overly in￿uential observations identi￿ed above. The estimated
values of  1 are negative, indicating that less precise (i.e., larger SE) studies do yield lower esti-
mates of PB (i.e., more present-biased). However, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the
coe￿cient on SE is zero. The intercept  0 represents an estimate of “true” underlying PB that has
been corrected for selective reporting. The results indicate that the bias-corrected estimate of PB
is statistically indistinguishable from 1, due to strong relationship between reported PB estimates
14This is an acronym for combination of Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT), Precision E￿ect Test (PET), and Precision
E￿ect Estimates with Standard Errors (PEESE).
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T￿￿￿￿ 6: Funnel plot asymmetry and precision e￿ect testing.
All studies Monetary (all) Monetary (“neutral”) E￿ort cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SE of PB estimate  1  1.4498  0.3679  1.3185  0.2480  1.6776  0.1872  2.0571  1.8720
(0.6187) (0.3329) (0.7260) (0.3410) (1.0459) (0.3917) (0.4412) (0.1093)
Constant  0 1.0002 0.9998 1.0077 0.9931
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0056) (0.0255)
FAT (H0 :  1 = 0) p-value 0.0265 0.2785 0.0852 0.4759 0.1261 0.6385 0.0016 0.0000
PET (H0 :  0 = 1) p-value 0.9475 0.9393 0.1831 0.7931
Study ￿xed e￿ect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 217 217 193 193 140 140 24 24
Number of studies 29 29 20 20 19 19 9 9
R2 0.1823 0.8429 0.1400 0.8377 0.1777 0.9055 0.5100 0.9503
Adjusted R2 0.1785 0.8186 0.1355 0.8189 0.1717 0.8906 0.4877 0.9183
Other bias-correction methods
Latent-studies method PB0 0.974 0.987 0.939 0.904
(0.040) (0.051) (0.064) (0.016)
Stem-based method PB0 0.9910 0.9910 0.9992 0.9266
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0253)
Note: Estimated by weighted least squares. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. Three observations with
large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded. In the speci￿cation with study ￿xed e￿ects, the constant
term is dropped and all the dummy variables for the studies are included. Details of the latent-studies method and
the stem-based method are presented in Online Appendices C.7 and C.8, respectively.
and their standard errors.15
It has been argued that the performance of commonly used bias-correction methods such as
the FAT-PET procedure depends on the nature of the data, and no single method dominates the
other in all circumstances (Alinaghi and Reed, 2018; Carter et al., 2019; Hong and Reed, 2019).
Therefore, we also report results from other bias-correction methods recently introduced in the
literature.
We ￿rst apply the latent studies method for identi￿cation and correction for publication bias
proposed by Andrews and Kasy (forthcoming), discussed in detail in Online Appendix C.7. These
results are shown in Tables 6 and C.8. None of the relative publication probabilities for estimates
15A closely related approach, PEESE, ￿ts a quadratic relationship between PB estimates and their standard errors,
by replacing SEi j in model (4) with SE2i j . Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, 2014) recommend the use of the PEESE
when the PET ￿nds a statistically signi￿cant e￿ect (i.e., reject H0 :  0 = 1).
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with di￿erent z-values are signi￿cantly di￿erent from one. Since there does not appear to be
substantial publication selection, the adjusted study estimates from the latent studies model are
very similar to the original study estimates (shown in Figure C.28 of the Online Appendix).
Finally, we apply the stem-based bias correction method developed by Furukawa (2019) (adapt-
ing Stanley et al., 2010), which is discussed in more detail in Online Appendix C.8. Intuitively,
this method provides a weighted average of the estimates from an optimally chosen subset of the
most precise studies. The results show insigni￿cant aggregate evidence for present bias across
the most precise studies. However, when only studies in which subjects make decisions over al-
locations of e￿ort are included, we ￿nd signi￿cant levels of present bias, as shown in Figure C.29.
Taken together, we view our results as demonstrating that there is evidence of modest se-
lective reporting in the direction of overreporting PB < 1, which manifests in the asymmetry of
funnel plots. This bias also appears stronger for studies using a real-e￿ort task. Correcting for
selective reporting gives values of PB that are still close to one for money and lower, 0.90-0.93,
for e￿ort.
4.3 Explaining Heterogeneity
We have thus far assumed that the variability in reported estimates are mainly due to sampling
errors, either at the observation level or study level, or both, and a modest amount of selective
reporting. However, these estimates come from studies that use a variety of experimental designs,
participants, and econometric approaches, which may result in systematic variation in reported
estimates. Online Appendix Figures C.10-C.20 visualize the e￿ects of some representative study
characteristics on reported estimates, looking at each characteristic in isolation.
In order to explain heterogeneity, we now add a set of moderator variables to model (4):
PBij =  0 +  1 · SEij +  Xij +  ij , (5)
whereXij is a vector of observable characteristics of jth estimate from study i and   is a coe￿-
cient vector.
Results from this meta-regression analysis report a tentative answer to the question: How
does PB vary reliably with methods, subject population, and other study characteristics?
In the ￿rst set of meta-regressions presented in Table 7, we restrict samples to those using
monetary reward. We consider eight basic sets of moderators asXij . These variables are catego-
rized into: treatment dummy (omitted category is Neutral condition), location of the experiment
(omitted category is Location: Lab), subject population (omitted category is Subject: Kids), tim-
ing of immediate reward payment (omitted category is by the end of the experiment), estimation
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method (omitted category is Estimation: Least squares), treatment of background (b.g.) consump-
tion (omitted category is Estimation: No b.g. consumption), and interface (omitted category is
Computerized).16 We also include several additional variables which are speci￿c to experiments
involving monetary reward: method of reward delivery (omitted category is Delivery: Check)
and treatment of confounding factors such as uncertainty regarding future reward and trans-
action costs (omitted category is Ignored in both variables). We estimate the model using the
unrestricted weighted least squares (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2017).
The e￿ects of study characteristics on estimated PB parameter exhibit interesting patterns.
For example, regression coe￿cients reported in Table 7 suggest that: university students and
the general population are less present-biased than children; ￿eld experiments tend to ￿nd less
present-biased preferences compared to lab studies; dealing with uncertainty about future reward
makes estimated PB smaller; and dealing with transaction costs makes estimated PB larger. How-
ever, these e￿ects are sensitive to which other characteristics are simultaneously controlled for.
We do not observe the e￿ects of reward delivery method, and whether or not to jointly estimate
background consumption has little impact on the estimates of PB.
Note that the timing of “immediate” payment appears to matter as discussed in the literature.
Compared to studies which guaranteed to deliver the “immediate” rewards within the day of the
experiment, estimated PB is smaller (more present-biased) when these “immediate” rewards were
delivered by the end of experiment.
Comparing monetary and non-monetary rewards. Models of intertemporal choices are
fundamentally about utility ￿ow at each time period and not about the receipt of monetary pay-
ments. A large share of existing empirical studies hasmeasured time preferences using time-dated
monetary payments, but additional assumptions (such as monetary payments are “consumed” at
the time of receipt) are necessary to infer individuals’ discount functions from observed choices
in this approach. More recent studies try to directly control the timing of utility ￿ow using, for
example, real-e￿ort tasks (e.g., Augenblick et al., 2015; Augenblick, 2018; Augenblick and Rabin,
2019; Carvalho et al., 2016), and report evidence that non-monetary rewards provide estimates of
present bias parameter that are smaller than those from the standard monetary reward studies.
Building on this discussion, our next set of meta-regressions compares PB estimates from
16In Abebe et al. (2017), the immediate reward was delivered on the next day of the experimental session. In other
words, their de￿nition of t = 0 is extended to “today and tomorrow.” Since our de￿nition of “immediate” is limited up
to the day of the experiment, estimates from this study (and only those estimates) are categorized into “Immediate”
pay: No immediate rewards.
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T￿￿￿￿ 7: Explaining the heterogeneity of reported estimates (monetary reward).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SE of PB estimate  0.915  1.141⇤  1.327⇤  1.248⇤⇤  1.951⇤⇤  1.711⇤
(0.471) (0.526) (0.525) (0.454) (0.636) (0.668)
Non-neutral condition  0.008  0.008  0.015  0.006  0.003  0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Subject: University students  0.003  0.006 0.023
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023)
Subject: General population  0.010  0.019 0.015
(0.010) (0.013) (0.029)
Location: Field 0.066⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤ 0.090⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
Location: Class 0.011 0.022 0.029⇤
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Location: Online  0.010  0.031⇤  0.026
(0.005) (0.014) (0.016)
“Immediate” pay: Within day 0.033 0.030⇤ 0.030⇤ 0.048⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.051⇤⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014)
“Immediate” pay: Not reported  0.015  0.011 0.014  0.066  0.060 0.046
(0.056) (0.053) (0.067) (0.056) (0.051) (0.065)
Delivery: Cash 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.029 0.017 0.024
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Delivery: Bank  0.006  0.007  0.009  0.004⇤  0.003  0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Delivery: Other  0.008  0.007  0.010⇤  0.008  0.008⇤  0.011⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Estimation: Tobit 0.005 0.013⇤ 0.018⇤ 0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Estimation: Other 0.004 0.006  0.002  0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Estimation: B.g. consumption  0.005 0.002  0.001  0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Deal uncertainty  0.015⇤⇤  0.005
(0.006) (0.004)
Deal transaction cost 0.053 0.111⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.038)
Paper and pencil 0.021  0.017
(0.025) (0.013)
Constant 0.981⇤⇤⇤ 0.989⇤⇤⇤ 0.916⇤⇤⇤ 0.963⇤⇤⇤ 0.963⇤⇤⇤ 0.854⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.019) (0.075) (0.017) (0.014) (0.052)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193
R2 0.372 0.384 0.442 0.457 0.500 0.523
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.343 0.394 0.427 0.464 0.480
Note: Observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded. Study ￿xed e￿ects are not included
in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001.
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studies with monetary and non-monetary rewards, correcting for selective reporting and several
study characteristics, to see whether the apparnet di￿erence in present bias is evident from CTB
alone. We set up a general regression model
PBij =  0 +  1 · SEij +  2 · SE2ij +  Xij +  1(SEij · Zij) +  2(SE2ij · Zij) +  ij , (6)
which extends equation (5) to allow for any factors that can potentially in￿uence selective re-
porting (captured by SEij · Zij and SE2ij · Zij). We include a dummy for monetary studies and its
interaction with several study characteristics, so that the constant term ( 0) captures the average
PB estimate from non-monetary studies.
Table 8 reports the results. The main variable of interest is the coe￿cient on the dummy Re-
ward: Money, which captures the di￿erence between the average PB from non-monetary studies
and that from the “baseline” monetary studies. The de￿nition of “baseline” studies is: “monetary
studies, neutral condition” in the odd columns; and “monetary studies, neutral condition, lab,
immediate rewards delivered within the day, estimation with NLS” in the even columns.
As discussed in the literature, studies using non-monetary rewards estimate present-bias pa-
rameters that are generally smaller than those from the standard monetary reward studies, re-
gardless of the de￿nition of the baseline in monetary studies (columns (1)-(2)). The other speci-
￿cations include either SE or SE2, as well as its interaction with Reward: Money. The estimated
coe￿cients on Reward: Money are not statistically signi￿cant when SE is included, but are signif-
icantly positive when SE2 is used. These results suggest that the di￿erence between average PB
frommonetary and non-monetary studies shrinks when potential selective reporting is corrected
for. However, the size of this di￿erence PBmoney   PBe￿ort depends on the assumption imposed on
the relationship between reported PB and SE.
Discussion. The selection of variables and the order of inclusion in the ￿rst meta-regression
analysis presented in Table 7 are based on prior discussion in the literature as well as co-occurence
of study characteristics in the data (Figures C.8 and C.9 in Online Appendix), and thus made
somewhat arbitrarily. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) recommend using a general-to-speci￿c
approach, also known as a backward stepwise model selection. It starts with including all ex-
planatory variables, and the least statistically signi￿cant variable is removed from the model one
at a time. This procedure continues until only statistically signi￿cant variables remain in the
model.
We augment our meta-regression analysis with the application of Bayesian model averaging
(BMA) to tackle the model uncertainty resulting from the large number of explanatory variables
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T￿￿￿￿ 8: Explaining the heterogeneity of reported estimates (monetary vs. non-monetary rewards).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant (PB from e￿ort-CTB) 0.907⇤⇤⇤ 0.907⇤⇤⇤ 0.993⇤⇤⇤ 0.993⇤⇤⇤ 0.932⇤⇤⇤ 0.932⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
SE of PB estimates  2.057⇤⇤⇤  2.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.414) (0.414)
SE2 of PB estimates  10.918⇤⇤⇤  10.918⇤⇤⇤
(2.829) (2.829)
Reward: Money 0.089⇤⇤⇤ 0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.015 0.016 0.068⇤⇤ 0.069⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
⇥ Non-neutral condition  0.003  0.012  0.011⇤⇤  0.006  0.007⇤  0.010
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
⇥ Location: Field 0.057⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.018) (0.020)
⇥ Location: Class 0.026 0.037⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤
(0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
⇥ Location: Online 0.004  0.026  0.006
(0.009) (0.014) (0.010)
⇥ “Immediate”: By end of exp  0.039⇤  0.042⇤⇤⇤  0.041⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
⇥ “Immediate”: Not reported  0.127⇤  0.112⇤  0.113⇤
(0.060) (0.051) (0.052)
⇥ Estimation: Tobit 0.002 0.019⇤ 0.009
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
⇥ Estimation: Other  0.005  0.002  0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
⇥ SE of PB estimates 0.374 0.065
(0.854) (0.708)
⇥ SE2 of PB estimates  36.379  26.427⇤
(22.497) (13.157)
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217
R2 0.054 0.375 0.249 0.504 0.222 0.456
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.348 0.235 0.478 0.207 0.427
H0 : PBe￿ort = 1 p = 0.0004 p = 0.7747 p = 0.0078
Note: Observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded. Study ￿xed e￿ects are not included
in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001.
we could have included in our meta-regression model (Hoeting et al., 1999; Moral-Benito, 2015;
Steel, forthcoming). BMA runs multiple regressions with di￿erent subsets of the explanatory
variables (models) andmarginalizes overmodels to obtain the posterior density of the parameters.
We provide a more detailed explanation in Online Appendix C.5. For applications of BMA in
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meta-analysis in economics, see Havránek et al. (2015, 2017) and Iršová and Havránek (2013).
The results of our application of BMA are in line with those reported in Table 7. Figure 4
is representative of our results (the full set of results is provided in Section C.5 of the Online
Appendix). In this ￿gure, columns denote individual models where variables are sorted by pos-
terior model probability in a descending order. Blue cells (darker cells in grayscale) indicate that
the variable is included in the model and has a positive coe￿cient, while red cells (lighter cells
in grayscale) indicate that the variable has a negative coe￿cient. White cells indicate that the
variable is not included in the model.
In meta-regression presented in Table 8, we do not include dummy variables for design char-
acteristics in non-monetary studies. This is solely due to power issue— there are only 24 es-
timates from nine e￿ort-CTB studies in our dataset. It is therefore important to revisit these
meta-regression analyses after the literature accumulates more estimates from CTB studies us-
ing non-monetary rewards.
5 Conclusion
We present a quantitative meta-analysis of estimates of the present-bias parameter in the QHD
model using choice data fromCTB experiments. We collect 220 estimates from 28 articles and ￿nd
that the meta-analytic average of the present-bias parameter is around 0.95, which is signi￿cantly
smaller than one, after taking the multi-level nature of the data into consideration. The values for
monetary-reward studies are close to one, however, and e￿ort-based studies have lower values,
around 0.9-0.93.
We also ￿nd that estimates vary greatly across studies, primarily due to their di￿erent study
characteristics. Our meta-regression analysis suggests that CTB experiments with non-monetary
rewards indeed found estimates that are “more present biased” than those from CTB with typical
monetary rewards, but the e￿ect is weakened after correcting for potential selective reporting.
Furthermore, we found evidence to con￿rm the suggestion by Ericson and Laibson (2019) regard-
ing the importance of the delay until the issue of the reward associated with the “current” time
period; across a range of speci￿cations in both our meta-regression and Bayesian model averag-
ing approach, studies that delivered rewards associated with the “current” period by the end of
the experiment, as opposed to only by the end of the day, tended to yield lower estimates of the
present bias parameter, indicating greater levels of present bias in the behavior of subjects.
In addition, we found suggestive evidence concerning the importance of a factor on estimates
of present bias that has so far not been widely discussed, the location of the study—whether it
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Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.5 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.79 0.86
u: other
u: CRRA
Estimate b.g. cons
Delivery: Cash
Delivery: Other
Estimation: Tobit
Subsample
Computerized
Delivery: Bank
Treatment
Estimation: LS
Subject: Univ. student
SE
Deal uncertainty
Subject: General
Now: Not reported
Deal transaction cost
Location: Field
Now: Within day
Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.42 0.5 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.8 0.86 0.94
u: other
Estimation: Tobit
Subsample
Estimate b.g. cons
Delivery: Cash
u: CRRA
Delivery: Bank
Subject: General
Estimation: LS
Subject: Univ. student
Location: Field
Delivery: Other
Computerized
Deal uncertainty
SE
Deal transaction cost
Now: Within day
Now: Not reported
F￿￿￿￿￿ 4: Model inclusion. Observations from monetary-CTB studies only. The top panel uses observa-
tions from both neutral and non-neutral conditions, while the bottom panel discards data from non-neutral
conditions.
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takes place in a laboratory or in the ￿eld. Both meta-regression and BMA suggest that subjects
in laboratory experiments show larger present bias than subjects in ￿eld experiments.
Many studies follow Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) original econometric strategy and report
estimates using both NLS and Tobit (or estimates with and without background consumption).
These methods ignited signi￿cant debate in the literature (see, for example, the discussion in
Andreoni et al., 2015). However, our meta-analysis showed that the econometric strategy makes
little di￿erence.
Indeed, some design characteristics that have consumed a lot of professional attention do
not appear to have e￿ects on PB that are robust across meta-regression speci￿cations. These
(tentative) non-e￿ects suggest that it is not a good idea to constrain experimental practices to
some kind of “ideal design”; instead, variations in designwill enable updating of themeta-analytic
database so we can learn more rapidly.
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A The Convex Time Budget Protocol
Idea. Consider two time points t (“sooner”) and t +k (“later”). A linear budget set of allocations
of monetary rewards to be received at those two times is a line connecting two points (x¯t , 0) and
(0, x¯t+k) on a two-dimensional plane. The ￿rst point corresponds to an agent receiving a certain
amount x¯t of reward at time t and nothing at t + k . The second point corresponds to receiving
a certain amount x¯t+k at time t + k and nothing at t . Any points on the interior of a budget set
represent allocations in which she receives positive rewards on both dates.
Figure A.1 illustrates two such budgets and choices from those budgets, marked as Bi and xi ,
i = a,b. The slopes of budget lines represent intertemporal tradeo￿s between rewards at two
time points (re￿ecting an implicit interest rate). This kind of budget-line ￿gure appears in every
microeconomics textbook, typically showing a budget line in two-good space and a family of
continuous iso-utility indi￿erence curves for bundles of goods in that space.
BaBb
xt+k
xt
xa
xb
F￿￿￿￿￿ A.1: An illustration of linear budget sets which ask allocations of monetary rewards to be received
at dates t and t + k . A hypothetical subject chose allocation xa from budget Ba , from which the subject
receives positive amount on both dates t and t +k . On the other hand, the subject receives positive amount
only on date t + k (and nothing on date t ) from allocation xb .
In order to identify and estimate parameters of di￿erent kinds of time preferences, an experi-
menter needs to vary the time points (t , t + k), the slopes of the budget lines, and the level of the
budget lines. Each budget line can be expressed as a set of these numbers.
Implementation. There are two main approaches to implement the CTB protocol. In the ￿rst
approach, subjects make allocation decisions. For example, in the original Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) experiment, subjects are endowed with 100 tokens which they allocate to “sooner” and
1
“later” tokens. Each account is associated with an exchange rate, which converts tokens into
monetary amounts. When the exchange rates are (et , et+k), allocating (at ,at+k) tokens to two
accounts implies monetary rewards of (at ⇥ et ,at+k ⇥ et+k). The ratio of exchange rates et+k/et
is the k-period gross interest rate. Many computerized experiments in the laboratory follow this
approach. In the second approach, used ￿rst in Andreoni et al. (2015), subjects select a reward
schedule (xt ,xt+k) from a set of options (typically less than 10) that are evenly spaced on the
budget line.
Econometric Strategy. Consider quasi-hyperbolic discounting with a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function of the form:
U (xt ,xt+k) = 1  (xt +  t )
  +  1{t=0} k
1
 
(xt+k +  t+k)  , (A.1)
where  is the per-period discount factor,   is the present bias,   is the curvature parameter, and t
and t+k are background consumption parameters. Maximizing (A.1) subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint
(1 + r )xt + xt+k = I ,
where 1 + r is the gross interest rate (over k days) and I is the budget, yields an intertemporal
Euler equation
xt +  t
xt+k +  t+k
=
⇣
 1{t=0} k(1 + r )
⌘ 1
  1
.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) propose two methods for estimating parameters (  ,   ,  ). The
￿rst one estimates the parameters in the log-linearized version of the Euler equation
log
✓
xt +  t
xt+k +  t+k
◆
=
log  
    1 · 1{t = 0} +
log 
    1 · k +
1
    1 · log(1 + r ), (A.2)
using two-limit Tobit regression in order to handle corner solutions under an additive error struc-
ture. The second one estimates the parameters in the optimal demand for sooner consumption
xt =
✓
1
1 + (1 + r )( 1{t=0} k(1 + r ))1/(  1)
◆
 t
+
✓ ( 1{t=0} k(1 + r ))1/(  1)
1 + (1 + r )( 1{t=0} k(1 + r ))1/(  1)
◆
(I +  t+k),
(A.3)
using Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS). In either case, parameters (  ,  ,  ) are recovered via a non-
linear combination of the estimated coe￿cients.
Econometric strategies used in e￿ort CTB experiments follow a similar idea and are discussed
in detail in Augenblick et al. (2015).
2
B Data
B.1 Identi￿cation and Selection Procedure
Total 271 estimates of PB
227 aggregate-level estimates of PB
44 individual-level estimates of PB
220 estimates of PB with SE
7 estimates of PB without SE
F￿￿￿￿￿ B.1: Types of PB estimates in the dataset.
3
B.2 Summary of Included Papers
T￿￿￿￿ B.1: List of articles using the CTB protocol (with QHD parameter estimates).
# Article Country Location Subject Reward Delivery Interface # budgets # options # frame
1 Abebe et al. (2017) Ethiopia Field General E￿ort Other Paper and pencil 10 51 2
2 Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) USA Lab Students Money Bank Computer 45 101 9
3 Andreoni et al. (2015) USA Lab Students Money Bank Paper and pencil 24 6 4
4 Andreoni et al. (2017) Pakistan Field General E￿ort Computer 8 277 2
5 Ashton (2015) USA Lab Students Money Paypal Computer 55 101 9
6 Augenblick et al. (2015) USA Lab Students Money Cash Computer 20 0 3
7 Aycinena and Rentschler (2018) Guatemala Field General Money Mix Paper and pencil 24 6 4
8 Aycinena et al. (2015) Guatemala Field General Money Gift card Computer 24 6 4
9 Balakrishnan et al. (2017) Kenya Lab General Money Gift card Computer 48 0 6
10 Banerji et al. (2018) India Field General Money Check Paper and pencil 24 5 4
11 Barcellos and Carvalho (2014) USA Online General Money Bank Computer 6 501 2
12 Barton (2015) USA Lab Students E￿ort Computer 34 91 2
13 Bartoš et al. (2018) Uganda Field General E￿ort Paper and pencil 10 6 2
14 Boonmanunt et al. (2018) Thailand Field General Money Check Paper and pencil 15 4 3
15 Bousquet (2016) France Lab Students Money Paypal Computer 40 21 10
16 Brocas et al. (2018) USA Lab Students Money Gift card Paper and pencil 45 11 9
17 Carvalho et al. (2016a) USA Online General Money Bank Computer 12 501 3
18 Carvalho et al. (2016b) Nepal Field General Money Bank Paper and pencil 4 3 3
19 Cerrone and Lades (2017) UK Lab Students Money Mix Computer 24 6 4
20 Chen et al. (forthcoming) China Field General Money Mix Paper and pencil 24 6 4
21 Clot et al. (2017) Uganda Field General Money Paper and pencil 15 3 3
22 Corbett (2016) USA Online Students E￿ort Computer 9 11 3
23 Hvide and Lee (2016) UK Lab Students Money Gift card Paper and pencil 36 6 6
24 Imai and Camerer (2018) USA Online General Money Computer 20 101 5
25 Imas et al. (2018) USA Online General E￿ort Computer 8 11 2
26 Janssens et al. (2017) Nigeria Field General Money Check Paper and pencil 8 11 2
27 Kölle and Wenner (2018) Germany Lab Students E￿ort Computer 12 51 2
28 Kuhn et al. (2017) France Lab Students Money Gift card Computer 45 17 9
29 Lindner and Rose (2017) Germany Lab Students Money Gift card Computer 24 6 4
30 Liu et al. (2014) Taiwan; China Lab Students Money Gift card Paper and pencil 10 61 2
31 Lührmann et al. (2018) Germany Class Kids Money Check Paper and pencil 21 4 3
32 Sawada and Kuroishi (2015a) Philippines Field General Money Paper and pencil 24 5 4
33 Sawada and Kuroishi (2015b) Japan Field General Money Paper and pencil 24 0
34 Stango et al. (2017) USA Online General Money Computer 24 101 4
35 Sun and Potters (2016) Netherlands Lab Students Money Gift card Computer 14 2
36 Yang and Carlsson (2016) China Field General Money Paper and pencil 10 21 2
Note: Sun and Potters (2016) varied the number of tokens (i.e., number of options; 101, 201, 301, 401, 801) to manip-
ulate the magnitude.
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T￿￿￿￿ B.2: List of articles using the CTB protocol (without QHD parameter estimates).
# Article Country Location Subject Reward Delivery Interface # budgets # options # frame
37 Alan and Ertac (2015) Turkey Field Kids Other Other Paper and pencil 4 6 2
38 Alan and Ertac (2018) Turkey Field Kids Other Other Paper and pencil 4 6 2
39 Alan and Ertac (2017) Turkey Field Kids Other Other Paper and pencil 1 6 1
40 Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) USA Lab Students Money Bank Computer 14 101 2
41 Andreoni et al. (2018) USA Lab Students Money Gift card Computer 16 8 2
42 Angerer et al. (2015) Italy Field Kids Other Other Paper and pencil 1 6 1
43 Atalay et al. (2014) USA Online General Money Computer 9 5
44 Batista et al. (2015) Mozambique Field General Money Gift card Paper and pencil 10 21 2
45 Blumenstock et al. (2018) Afghanistan Field General Money Gift card Paper and pencil 10 3 2
46 Bover et al. (2018) Spain Field Kids Other Other Paper and pencil 9 4 3
47 Bulte et al. (2016) Vietnam Field General Money Paper and pencil 20 0 4
48 Cheung (2015) Australia Lab Students Money Bank Paper and pencil 14 101 2
49 Clot and Stanton (2014) Uganda Field General Money Paper and pencil 10 3 2
50 de Oliveira and Jacobson (2017) USA Lab Students E￿ort Computer 10 61 1
51 de Quidt et al. (2018) USA Online General Money Other Computer 1 0 1
52 Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2017) Germany Lab Students Money Gift card Paper and pencil 36 101
53 Ersoy (2017) USA Online Students Money Other Computer 24 5 4
54 Esopo et al. (2018) Kenya Lab General Money Gift card Paper and pencil 0 0
55 Franco and Mahadevan (2017) Colombia Lab Students Money Computer 16 51 4
56 Giné et al. (2018) Malawi Field General Money Cash Paper and pencil 10 21 2
57 Grijalva et al. (2018) USA Lab Students Money Paper and pencil 36 101 4
58 Hoel et al. (2016) Ethiopia Lab Students Money Cash Paper and pencil 12 6 1
59 Mayer et al. (2015) USA Field General Money Computer 15 4 3
60 Miao and Zhong (2015) Singapore Lab Students Money Bank Paper and pencil 14 101 2
61 Mudzingiri (2017) South Africa Lab Students Money Gift card Paper and pencil 1 6 1
62 Penczynski and Santana (2016) Philippines Field General Money Check Paper and pencil 18 16 2
63 Potters et al. (2016) Netherlands Online General Money Gift card Paper and pencil 40 11 2
64 Rong et al. (2018) USA Lab General Money Bank Computer 9 101 1
65 Savani et al. (2018) Singapore Lab Students Money Gift card Paper and pencil 40 51
66 Slonim et al. (2013) Australia Lab Students Money Paper and pencil 6 6 2
67 Sutter et al. (2018) Italy Field Kids Other Other Paper and pencil 1 6 1
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T￿￿￿￿ B.3: List of articles with some treatment variations.
Study Treatment dimension
Abebe et al. (2017) Incentive size
Alan and Ertac (2017) Degree of optimism
Alan and Ertac (2018) Educational intervention
Andreoni et al. (2018) Salience of arbitrage
Ashton (2015) Fatigue and hunger
Atalay et al. (2014) Availability of a prize-linked savings account
Aycinena and Rentschler (2018) Payo￿ display
Balakrishnan et al. (2017) “Immediate” reward delivery timing
Bartoš et al. (2018) Poverty priming
Bulte et al. (2016) Male partner invited to join the training or not
Carvalho et al. (2016a) Payday timing
Carvalho et al. (2016b) Bank account assignment
Chen et al. (forthcoming) Hunger
Cheung (2015) Probability of reward
Hoel et al. (2016) Self-control fatigue
Hvide and Lee (2016) Windfall or hard-earned money
Imai and Camerer (2018) Budget set construction, ￿xed, random, or adaptive
Kuhn et al. (2017) Cognitive resource depletion
Lindner and Rose (2017) Time pressure
Liu et al. (2014) Confucius priming
Lührmann et al. (2018) Financial education
Penczynski and Santana (2016) Future payment by micro￿nance or local money lender
Potters et al. (2016) Stakes, time horizon, and frame
Yang and Carlsson (2016) Separate or joint decision by couples
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B.3 Coded Variables
T￿￿￿￿ B.4: List of coded variables.
Variable Description
Atricle meta data
main.lastnames Last names of the authors
main.firstnames First names of the authors
main.title Title of the paper
main.published 1 if published or “in press”; 0 if unpublished; 9 if “do not circulate”
main.yearpub Year of publication
main.monthpub Month of publication
main.journal Journal
main.unpub.year Year this version was written (for unpublished papers)
main.unpub.month Month this version was written (for unpublished papers)
main.unpub.day Day this version was written (for unpublished papers)
main.length Number of pages (main content; excluding appendices)
main.length.appendix Number of pages (online appendices)
main.affliations A￿liations of the authors
main.fund Funding sources
main.data.available 1 if data is publicly available
main.instructions 1 if instructions available
Additional info about published article
pub.topfive 1 if published in Top 5 (AER, ECMA, JPE, QJE, REStud)
pub.firstyear Year of the ￿rst draft (or the oldest version identi￿ed)
Treatment and sample
treatment.neutral 1 if control / neutral treatment
treatment.nonneutral 1 if some treatment variation
treatment.dimension Description of treatment
sample.all 1 if estimation is based on all sample
sample.sub 1 if estimation is based on subsample
sample.dimension Description of subsample
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Variable Description
Location of the experiment
location.lab 1 if laboratory experiment
location.field 1 if ￿eld experiment
location.amt 1 if Amazon Mechanical Turk
location.class 1 if classroom experiment
location.survey 1 if online survey
location.continent Continent
location.country Country
location.city City
location.state State
Method
method.numbudget Number of budget lines
method.numoption Number of available options on each budget
method.corner 1 if corners of the budget are available
method.calendar 1 if calendar is presented
method.computer 1 if computer interface was used; 0 if paper and pencil
method.input 1 if subjects entered desired allocation
method.checkbox 1 if subjects marked/clicked an option
method.slider 1 if subjects made an allocation decision by a slider
method.physical 1 if subjects allocated physical objects (e.g. marbles)
method.timelimit Time limit (in second) in each decision
Time frame and budgets
ctb.time.unit Time unit for (t ,k)
ctb.sooner Potential sooner payment dates
ctb.delay Potential delay length
ctb.grossint Gross interest rate over k periods
ctb.num.sooner Number of potential sooner payment dates (t )
ctb.num.delay Number of potential delay length (k)
ctb.num.frame Number of time frames (i.e. (t ,k) pairs)
ctb.num.slope Number of budget slopes (gross interest rates over k periods)
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Variable Description
Reward
reward.real 1 if real reward
reward.certain 1 if all payments are certain
reward.risky 1 if payment risk is introduced (not about “random incentive system”)
reward.correlated.risk 1 if payment risk is realized in a single lottery
reward.money 1 if monetary reward
reward.food 1 if food reward
reward.effort 1 if e￿ort cost
reward.other 1 if other type of reward
Delivery of future reward
delivery.pickup 1 if subjects came back to the lab to pickup reward
delivery.cash 1 if payments were made by cash
delivery.check 1 if payments were made by checks
delivery.paypal 1 if payments were made by PayPal
delivery.giftcard 1 if paymentts were made by gift card (e.g. Amazon)
delivery.bank 1 if payments were made by bank transfer
delivery.other 1 if other reward delivery method
delivery.notreported 1 if delivery method is not explained (or cannot be guessed)
Unit of time period presented
time.minute 1 if time unit presented is “minute”
time.hour 1 if time unit presented is “hour”
time.day 1 if time unit presented is “day”
time.week 1 if time unit presented is “week”
time.month 1 if time unit presented is “month”
time.year 1 if time unit presented is “year”
time.mix 1 if time unit presented is mixture of the above
time.notreported 1 if time unit is not explained (or cannot be guessed)
De￿nition of “now”
now.fedelay 1 if front-end-delay is introduced
now.mixed 1 if some choices involve “now” and some other don’t
now.choice 1 if “now” payment is delivered right after choice
now.end 1 if “now” payment is delivered at the end of the experiment
now.day 1 if “now” payment is delivered within the same day of the experiment
now.notreported 1 if “now” payment timing is not explained
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Variable Description
Implementation
imp.deal.uncertainty 1 if deal with uncertainty about future payment; 0 if not mentioned
imp.deal.transactioncost 1 if trying to equalize transaction costs; 0 if not mentioned
Subject pool
subject.child 1 if subjects are children
subject.teen 1 if subjects are teenagers
subject.university 1 if subjects are university students
subject.elderly 1 if elderly population
subject.gen 1 if general population
subject.farm 1 if subjects are farmers
subject.age.min Minimum age
subject.age.max Maximum age
subject.age.mean Mean age
subject.age.median Median age
subject.age.sd Standard deviation of age
subject.male Fraction of male participants
Utility speci￿cations
spec.u.est 1 if utility curvature is simultaneously estimated
spec.u.imputed 1 if utility curvature is imputed by some other measure
spec.u.crra 1 if CRRA
spec.u.cara 1 if CARA
spec.u.convex.effort 1 if convex cost of e￿ort utility
spec.u.other 1 if other functional form of u is assumed
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Variable Description
Estimation methods
est.ols 1 if ordinary least squares
est.nls 1 if nonlinear least squares
est.max.likelihood 1 if Max Likelihood estimation
est.tobit 1 if Tobit regression
est.mlogit 1 if multinomial logit regression
est.temperature 1 if noise (temperature) parameter is estimated in logit speci￿cation
est.invtemperature 1 if noise (inverse temperature) parameter is estimated in logit speci￿cation
est.fechner 1 if noise (Fechner) parameter is estimated
est.trembling 1 if noise (trembling hand) parameter is estimated
est.bgcons.fixed 1 if background consumption is not ￿xed at zero
est.bgcons.param 1 if background consumption is estimated jointly with other parameters
est.bgcons.sooner Level of background consumption for sooner period
est.bgcons.later Level of background consumption for later period
est.bgcons.sooner.se Standard error of estimated b.g. consumption for sooner period
est.bgcons.later.se Standard error of estimated b.g. consumption for later period
est.bgcons.same 1 if sooner b.g. cons = later b.g. cons assumed
est.bgcons.same.se Standard error of estimated b.g. consumption (sooner = later)
est.bgcons.ind.report 1 if background consumption is based on subject’s report
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Variable Description
Aggregate results
ares.present 1 if aggregate estimates is reported
ares.units.discount Time unit for QHD model
ares.drate Estimated discount rate
ares.drate.error Standard error of estimated discount rate
ares.dfactor Estimated discount factor
ares.dfactor.error Standard error of estimated discount factor
ares.pbias Estimated present bias
ares.pbias.error Standard error of estimated present bias
ares.ucurv Estimated utility curvature
ares.ucurv.error Standard error of estimated utility curvature
ares.convex.effort Estimated convex e￿ort cost function
ares.convex.effort.se Standard error of estimated convex e￿ort cost function
ares.temperature Estimated temperature parameter
ares.temperature.error Standard error of estimated temperature parameter
ares.invtemperature Estimated inverse temperature parameter
ares.invtemperature.error Standard error of estimated inverse temperature parameter
ares.fechner Estimated Fechner noise parameter
ares.fechner.error Standard error of estimated Fechner noise parameter
ares.trembling Estimated trembling hand parameter
ares.trembling.error Standard error of estimated trembling hand parameter
ares.rsquared (Adjusted) R-squared from regression
ares.loglikelihood Log likelihood
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C Additional Results
C.1 Funnel Plot
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.1: Funnel plot of present bias parameter estimates PB. The  -axis is presented in the log-scale in
the right panel.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.2: Funnel plot of present bias parameter estimates PB. The  -axis is presented in the log-scale in
the right panel.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.3: Funnel plot of present bias parameter estimates PB from monetary-CTB. The  -axis is pre-
sented in the log-scale in the right panel.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.4: Funnel plot of present bias parameter estimates PB from e￿ort-CTB.
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C.2 Study and Design Characteristics
123421
F￿￿￿￿￿ C.5: Number of studies by country.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.6: CTB design characteristics.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.7: Co-occurences of CTB design characteristics. Study-level data, with and without parameter
estimates.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.8: Co-occurences of CTB design characteristics. Estimate-level data.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.9: Co-occurences of CTB design characteristics. Estimate-level data, monetary reward only.
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C.3 Present Bias and Design Characteristics
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.10: Treatment type.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.11: Continent.
20
010
20
30
40
50
0.6 0.8 1.0
Aggregate PB estimate
# 
ob
s.
Lab
Field
Class
Online
A
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
Lab Field Class Online
Ag
g.
 P
B 
es
tim
at
e
B
F￿￿￿￿￿ C.12: Location of the experiment.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.13: Subject population.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.14: Reward type.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.15: Monetary reward delivery method.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.16: Experimental interface.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.17: Econometric approach.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.18: Timing of immediate reward.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.19: Deal with uncertainty of future payment.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.20: Equalize transaction costs between two periods.
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C.4 Meta-Regression Analysis
Simple meta-analytic averages. We present meta-analytic averages PB0 calculated from: (i)
all data including in￿uential (|DFBETAS | > 1) observations (Table C.1), (ii) observations using
monetary reward (Table C.2), (iii) observations using monetary reward excluding in￿uential esti-
mates (Table C.3), and (iv) observations using monetary reward (Table C.4). These tables present
the random-e￿ects estimates in addition to the unrestricted weighted least squares (UWLS) and
multi-level estimates.
T￿￿￿￿ C.1: Meta-analytic average of present bias parameter (cf. Table 5).
All studies “Neutral” studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB0 0.9875 0.9662 0.9532 0.9890 0.9647 0.9565
(0.0084) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0098) (0.0195) (0.0142)
p-value 0.1444 0.0261 0.0021 0.2701 0.0813 0.0048
Model UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level
Observations (m) 220 220 220 162 162 162
Number of studies 31 31 31 29 29 29
Note: p-values are from the two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 : PB = 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster-robust (Hedges et al., 2010). Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are included.
T￿￿￿￿ C.2: Meta-analytic average of present bias parameter (monetary reward only).
All studies “Neutral” studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB0 0.9876 0.9720 0.9750 0.9892 0.9715 0.9754
(0.0084) (0.0147) (0.0141) (0.0099) (0.0204) (0.0148)
p-value 0.1562 0.0708 0.0912 0.2873 0.1786 0.1112
Model UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level
Observations (m) 196 196 196 142 142 142
Number of studies 22 22 22 21 21 21
Note: p-values are from the two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 : PB = 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster-robust (Hedges et al., 2010). Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are included.
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T￿￿￿￿ C.3: Meta-analytic average of present bias parameter (monetary reward only).
All studies “Neutral” studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB0 0.9943 0.9723 0.9758 0.9964 0.9716 0.9766
(0.0020) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0036) (0.0209) (0.0161)
p-value 0.0107 0.0805 0.1334 0.3317 0.1898 0.1640
Model UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level
Observations (m) 193 193 193 140 140 140
Number of studies 20 20 20 19 19 19
Note: p-values are from the two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 : PB = 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster-robust (Hedges et al., 2010). Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded.
T￿￿￿￿ C.4: Meta-analytic average of present bias parameter (e￿ort cost only).
All studies “Neutral” studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB0 0.9072 0.8815 0.8802 0.9146 0.8886 0.8880
(0.0242) (0.0171) (0.0208) (0.0230) (0.0156) (0.0164)
p-value 0.0050 0.0001 0.0004 0.0076 0.0002 0.0003
Model UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level UWLS Random-e￿ects Multi-level
Observations (m) 24 24 24 20 20 20
Number of studies 9 9 9 8 8 8
Note: p-values are from the two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 : PB = 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster-robust (Hedges et al., 2010). Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are not in this
subset of data.
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FAT-PET. Table C.5 presents the analysis including three “overly in￿uential” observations (cf.
Table 6).
T￿￿￿￿ C.5: Funnel plot asymmetry and precision e￿ect testing.
All studies Monetary (all) Monetary (“neutral”) E￿ort cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SE of PB estimate  1  0.9623  0.3649  0.7849  0.2447  0.6752  0.1872  2.0571  1.8720
(0.8164) (0.3342) (0.9410) (0.3422) (1.2438) (0.3934) (0.4412) (0.1093)
Constant  0 0.9907 0.9902 0.9920 0.9931
(0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0255)
FAT (H0 :  1 = 0) p-value 0.24781 0.2836 0.4136 0.4825 0.5932 0.6394 0.0016 0.0000
PET (H0 :  0 = 1) p-value 0.3566 0.3491 0.5527 0.7931
Study ￿xed e￿ect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 220 220 196 196 142 142 24 24
Number of studies 31 31 22 22 21 21 9 9
R2 0.0326 0.9372 0.0193 0.9384 0.0146 0.9644 0.5100 0.9503
Adjusted R2 0.0282 0.9269 0.0142 0.9305 0.0076 0.9582 0.4877 0.9183
Note: Estimated by weighted least squares. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. Three observations with
large in￿uence measure (|dfbetas | > 1) are included. In the speci￿cation with study ￿xed e￿ects, the constant term
is dropped and all the dummy variables for the studies are included.
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Heterogeneity. Tables C.6 and C.7 report the results from meta-regressions estimating the
same models as in Tables 7 and 8, but with overly in￿uential estimates.
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T￿￿￿￿ C.6: Explaining the heterogeneity of reported estimates (monetary reward; including overly in￿u-
ential estimates; cf. Table 7).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SE of PB estimate 0.978 0.726  0.218 0.852 0.926  1.011
(1.032) (0.840) (0.661) (1.082) (0.885) (0.626)
Non-neutral condition  0.009⇤⇤  0.007⇤  0.008⇤  0.009⇤⇤  0.008⇤⇤  0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Subject: University students 0.013 0.023  0.011
(0.014) (0.017) (0.023)
Subject: General population 0.012 0.038  0.017
(0.016) (0.023) (0.032)
Location: Field 0.042 0.039 0.130⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.040) (0.033)
Location: Class  0.008  0.023 0.069⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.020) (0.022)
Location: Online  0.0002 0.027⇤  0.019⇤
(0.004) (0.013) (0.010)
“Immediate” pay: Within day 0.030⇤ 0.050⇤ 0.029 0.037⇤⇤ 0.043 0.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.022) (0.015)
“Immediate” pay: Not reported  0.050  0.048 0.028  0.083  0.078 0.059
(0.063) (0.061) (0.073) (0.064) (0.067) (0.068)
Delivery: Cash 0.011 0.045 0.015 0.015 0.047 0.029
(0.016) (0.030) (0.022) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020)
Delivery: Bank  0.041⇤  0.039⇤⇤⇤  0.030⇤⇤⇤  0.039⇤  0.028⇤  0.014
(0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.019) (0.013) (0.008)
Delivery: Other  0.012⇤  0.014⇤  0.019⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤  0.010⇤  0.014⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Estimation: Tobit  0.033⇤  0.003  0.036⇤⇤ 0.006
(0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008)
Estimation: Other 0.020 0.021⇤⇤ 0.011 0.003
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
Estimation: B.g. consumption  0.011  0.004  0.004  0.003
(0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
Deal uncertainty  0.019⇤  0.005
(0.008) (0.004)
Deal transaction cost 0.030 0.123⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.043)
Paper and pencil  0.041⇤⇤  0.070⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.960⇤⇤⇤ 0.946⇤⇤⇤ 0.984⇤⇤⇤ 0.966⇤⇤⇤ 0.967⇤⇤⇤ 0.845⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.033) (0.083) (0.014) (0.025) (0.059)
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.424 0.588 0.731 0.436 0.607 0.798
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.561 0.708 0.405 0.579 0.780
Note: Observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are included. Study ￿xed e￿ects are not included
in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001.
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T￿￿￿￿ C.7: Explaining the heterogeneity of reported estimates (monetary vs. non-monetary rewards; cf.
Table 8).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant (PB from e￿ort-CTB) 0.907⇤⇤⇤ 0.907⇤⇤⇤ 0.907⇤⇤⇤ 0.993⇤⇤⇤ 0.993⇤⇤⇤ 0.993⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
SE of PB estimates  2.057⇤⇤⇤  2.057⇤⇤⇤  2.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.414) (0.414) (0.414)
Reward: Money 0.082⇤⇤ 0.075⇤⇤ 0.092⇤⇤⇤  0.0002  0.015 0.001
(0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.024)
⇥ Non-neutral condition  0.003  0.013⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤  0.005  0.013⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
⇥ Location: Field 0.063⇤ 0.061 0.057⇤ 0.054
(0.027) (0.040) (0.026) (0.040)
⇥ Location: Class 0.027 0.030 0.022 0.024
(0.018) (0.030) (0.022) (0.033)
⇥ Location: Online 0.024 0.048⇤⇤ 0.027 0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
⇥ “Immediate”: By end of exp  0.021  0.016  0.024  0.019
(0.023) (0.030) (0.021) (0.031)
⇥ “Immediate”: Not reported  0.115  0.122  0.121  0.129
(0.063) (0.067) (0.064) (0.068)
⇥ Estimation: Tobit  0.042⇤⇤  0.043⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.013)
⇥ Estimation: Other  0.007  0.007
(0.007) (0.008)
⇥ SE of PB estimates 1.175 2.881 2.988⇤⇤
(1.058) (1.482) (0.986)
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220
R2 0.019 0.262 0.519 0.047 0.280 0.540
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.237 0.498 0.030 0.249 0.516
H0 : PBe￿ort = 1 p = 0.0004 p = 0.7743
Note: Observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are included. Study ￿xed e￿ects are not included
in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the study level. ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001.
29
C.5 Bayesian Model Averaging
In Section 4.3, we estimate a meta-regression model of the form:
 i =  0 +  Xi +  i .
A problem arises when the set of potential explanatory variables X is large and a researcher is
not sure which variables should be included in the model.
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approaches such model uncertainty by estimating models
for all possible combination of potential explanatory variables in X and constructing a weighted
average (Moral-Benito, 2015; Steel, forthcoming). Suppose the size of X is q. Then, there are 2q
candidate modelsMm, indexed bym, to be estimated.
Let P(Mm) be a prior model probability. It is typically assumed to be uniform (P(Mm) / 1) to
represent the lack of knowledge. We can calculate the posterior model probability using Bayes’
rule as:
P(Mm | y) = f (y | Mm)P(Mm)
f (y) ,
where f denotes a (conditional) likelihood of observation y. Since each model Mm depends on
parameters  m, we can calculate the posterior for the parameters associated withMm as:
 ( m | y,Mm) = f (y |  
m,Mm) ( m | Mm)
f (y | Mm) .
Combining these observations, we now obtain the posterior of the parameters for all the models
under consideration:
 (  | y) =
2q’
m=1
 ( m | y,Mm)P(Mm | y).
Following ￿gures represent results from BMA. In each plot, columns denote individual models
where variables are sorted by posterior model probability in a descending order. Blue cells (darker
cells in grayscale) indicate that the variable is included in the model and has a positive coe￿cient,
while red cells (lighter cells in grayscale) indicate that the variable has a negative coe￿cient.
White cells indicate that the variable is not included in the model.
Figure C.21 and Figure C.22 use observations both frommonetary-CTB and e￿ort-CTB, while
Figures C.23 and C.24 (reported as Figure 4 in the main paper) focus only on monetary CTB.
The top panel in each plot uses observations both from neutral and non-neutral conditions and
the bottom panel discards data from non-neutral conditions. Observations with large in￿uence
measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded.
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Subject: Univ. student
Now: No immediate
Subject: General
Location: Field
Now: Not reported
Reward: Effort cost
Location: Online
Now: Within day
SE
Model Inclusion Based on Best  485  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.19 0.29 0.37 0.47 0.55 0.63 0.7 0.78 0.85 0.93 1
Now: No immediate
u: other
Subsample
u: CRRA
Subject: General
Computerized
u: Estimated
Subject: Univ. student
Location: Field
Estimation: LS
Estimation: Tobit
Estimate b.g. cons
Now: Not reported
Reward: Effort cost
Now: Within day
Location: Online
SE
F￿￿￿￿￿ C.21: Model inclusion. Observations from both monetary-CTB and e￿ort-CTB studies. The top
panel of the ￿gure uses observations from both neutral and non-neutral conditions, while the bottom
panel discards data from non-neutral conditions.
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Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.3 0.37 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.66 0.73 0.8 0.86
u: other
u: CRRA
Estimate b.g. cons
Subsample
u: Estimated
Estimation: LS
Computerized
Estimation: Tobit
Subject: Univ. student
Treatment
Now: No immediate
Deal uncertainty
Now: Not reported
Subject: General
Deal transaction cost
Location: Field
Reward: Effort cost
Location: Online
Now: Within day
SE
Model Inclusion Based on Best  755  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.4 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.72 0.8 0.87 0.95
u: CRRA
Subject: General
Subsample
Now: No immediate
u: other
Subject: Univ. student
u: Estimated
Computerized
Estimation: LS
Estimation: Tobit
Location: Field
Now: Not reported
Estimate b.g. cons
Deal transaction cost
Deal uncertainty
Reward: Effort cost
Now: Within day
Location: Online
SE
F￿￿￿￿￿ C.22: Model inclusion. Observations from both monetary-CTB and e￿ort-CTB studies. The top
panel uses observations from both neutral and non-neutral conditions, while the bottom panel discards
data from non-neutral conditions.
Model Inclusion Based on Best  780  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.6 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.9 0.97
u: other
Delivery: Cash
u: CRRA
Estimate b.g. cons
Delivery: Other
Treatment
Estimation: Tobit
Computerized
Delivery: Bank
Subsample
Subject: Univ. student
Estimation: LS
SE
Subject: General
Location: Field
Now: Within day
Now: Not reported
Model Inclusion Based on Best  646  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.4 0.48 0.57 0.65 0.73 0.8 0.87 0.94
Delivery: Cash
u: other
Estimate b.g. cons
Estimation: Tobit
u: CRRA
Subject: General
Delivery: Bank
Subsample
Estimation: LS
Location: Field
Subject: Univ. student
Computerized
Delivery: Other
SE
Now: Within day
Now: Not reported
F￿￿￿￿￿C.23: Model inclusion. Observations frommonetary-CTB studies only. The top panel uses observa-
tions from both neutral and non-neutral conditions, while the bottom panel discards data from non-neutral
conditions.
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Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.5 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.79 0.86
u: other
u: CRRA
Estimate b.g. cons
Delivery: Cash
Delivery: Other
Estimation: Tobit
Subsample
Computerized
Delivery: Bank
Treatment
Estimation: LS
Subject: Univ. student
SE
Deal uncertainty
Subject: General
Now: Not reported
Deal transaction cost
Location: Field
Now: Within day
Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.42 0.5 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.8 0.86 0.94
u: other
Estimation: Tobit
Subsample
Estimate b.g. cons
Delivery: Cash
u: CRRA
Delivery: Bank
Subject: General
Estimation: LS
Subject: Univ. student
Location: Field
Delivery: Other
Computerized
Deal uncertainty
SE
Deal transaction cost
Now: Within day
Now: Not reported
F￿￿￿￿￿C.24: Model inclusion. Observations frommonetary-CTB studies only. The top panel uses observa-
tions from both neutral and non-neutral conditions, while the bottom panel discards data from non-neutral
conditions.
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C.6 Cumulative Meta Analysis
A cumulative meta-analysis (CMA) is a series of meta-analyses in which studies are added to the
analysis based on a pre-speci￿ed order (Borenstein et al., 2009). When the series of studies are
sorted by some factor (such as year of publication, sample size, and so on), CMA shows how
the e￿ect size estimates shift as a function of this particular factor. For example, CMA with
chronologically sorted sequence of studies shows how the e￿ect size under consideration shifts
over time (temporal trend). It can also be used as a tool to detect possible publication bias. CMA
is commonly used in the medical literature studying the e￿ects of treatments (e.g., Lau et al., 1992,
1995). Note, however, that CMA is “a mechanism for display, rather than analysis” (Borenstein
et al., 2009, p. 375), meaning that MRA is the appropriate method when we are interested in the
relationship between a factor and e￿ect size.
Here, we apply CMA to our dataset, after excluding overly in￿uential observations from Bar-
cellos and Carvalho (2014) and Liu et al. (2014), ordered chronologically by the earliest year a
version of the paper could be accessed (usually unpublished working papers posted online). 1
Within years, studies are ordered alphabetically by the name of the ￿rst author.
Figure C.25 shows the results of our CMA for studies using monetary rewards that equate
transaction costs across periods. Figure C.26 shows the results of our CMA for studies where
subjects make decisions over allocations of e￿ort. In these ￿gures, we use the multi-level model
outlined by Van den Noortgate et al. (2013), beginning by just using the results of the ￿rst study in
our chronological ordering, and then successively re-estimating on the sample that incorporates
the subsequent study in the ordering as well, until we reach the sample containing all relevant
studies.2
Although there is evidence of present-bias in the context of e￿ort studies, the evidence for
present-bias over monetary rewards once transaction costs have been equated between periods
is much weaker. 3
1For example, even though Andreoni and Sprenger’s original study was published in 2012, the earliest accessible
working paper version was circulated in 2009 (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2009, available online). As a result, for the
purposes of ordering studies for our CMA, we count the year of this study as being 2009.
2Van den Noortgate et al.’s (2013) multi-level model is described in Section 4.1.
3Note that the con￿dence interval for the average level of present bias does not have to shrink as new studies are
added, since estimates from studies that are substantially di￿erent from chronologically prior estimates will increase
the estimated unconditional variance of the present-bias parameter between studies, hence new estimates can in fact
cause the con￿dence interval for “true” value of the present-bias parameter (among the hypothetical population of
studies) to increase.
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Boonmanunt et al. (2018) / 2018
Aycinena and Rentschler (2018) / 2017
Lindner and Rose (2017) / 2016
Hvide and Lee (2016) / 2016
Sun and Potters (2016) / 2015
Carvalho et al. (2016a) / 2015
Bousquet (2016) / 2015
Balakrishnan et al. (2017) / 2015
Aycinena et al. (2015) / 2015
Ashton (2015) / 2015
Luehrmann et al. (2018) / 2014
Carvalho et al. (2016b) / 2013
Augenblick et al. (2015) / 2013
Andreoni et al. (2015) / 2013
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) / 2009
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.25: CMA results only including studies using monetary rewards and equating transaction costs
across both periods. Years in parentheses indicate the publication year or the latest version of the working
paper. Years at the end indicate the earliest accessible working paper version.
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Koelle and Wenner (2018) / 2018
Bartos et al. (2018) / 2018
Abebe et al. (2017) / 2017
Corbett (2016) / 2016
Imas et al. (2018) / 2015
Barton (2015) / 2015
Andreoni et al. (2017) / 2015
Augenblick et al. (2015) / 2013
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.26: CMA results only including studies where subjects make decisions regarding allocations of
e￿ort. Years in parentheses indicate the publication year or the latest version of the working paper. Years
at the end indicate the earliest accessible working paper version.
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C.7 Latent Studies Model
Andrews and Kasy (forthcoming), hereafter AK, propose using the collected data from a meta-
analysis to model the conditional probability of publication as a function of a study’s results.
The conditional publication probabilities can then be used to generate publication-bias-corrected
estimates for the reported results from each study, along with associated con￿dence intervals.
The setup for their nonparametric estimator is to assume that there exists a population of
latent studies indexed by i . The true parameter that study i attempts to estimate is denoted  ⇤i ,
and is drawn from distribution µ , such that it may vary across studies.
The result for latent study i , denoted X ⇤i , is drawn from the normal distribution N ( ⇤i ,  ⇤i 2),
where  ⇤i is the (￿xed) standard deviation of the estimate X ⇤i in latent study i . AK then assume
that we only observe “published” studies, with latent studies published with probability p(Z ⇤i ),
where Z ⇤i = X ⇤i / ⇤i .
We use the degree of present biasX ⇤i = 1 PBi , the deviation of estimated present-bias param-
eter from one, as the variable of interest. 4 Figure C.27A shows the density plot of the z-statistics.
The plot does exhibit jumps in the density around the cuto￿s  1.96 and 1.96, unlike many appli-
cations discussed in Andrews and Kasy (forthcoming). Figure C.27B is the funnel plot and carries
the same information as Figure 1.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.27: (A) Binned density plot for the z-statistics Z ⇤ = X ⇤/ ⇤. (B) Joint distribution of the estimated
degree of present bias and the standard error. The grey lines mark |X ⇤ |/ ⇤ = 1.96. Overly in￿uential
(|DFBETAS | > 1) observations are excluded. The ￿gure is generated with the package provided by AK.
AK show that we can identify p(·) up to scale using the data collected in a meta-analysis, and
then use the estimated p(·) to derive median unbiased estimators and valid con￿dence intervals
4This means that estimates of present bias less than one will yield positive z values.
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for  i =  i/ i for “published” studies (random variables relating only to “published” studies are
denoted by the lack of an asterisk). The intuition behind this identi￿cation result is that, in the
presence of publication bias, we can glean information on the probability of a given result being
published by comparing the observed distribution of results from studies with di￿erent standard
deviations to see if there are areas of the distribution of estimates with fewer results than would
be expected given the results from other studies and the standard deviation of estimates in this
area of the distribution.
We use the following speci￿cation for the likelihood of publication, also considered by AK:
 ⇤ ⇠ N( ¯ ,  ˜ 2), p(Z ) /
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 p,1 Z <  1.96
 p,2  1.96  Z < 0
 p,3 0  Z < 1.96
1 Z   1.96
.
The results from this speci￿cation are provided in Table C.8. They indicate the intuitive result
that studies showing statistically signi￿cant future bias are less likely to be reported than studies
showing either statistically signi￿cant present bias (re￿ected in  p,1 < 1) or studies showing no
signi￿cant present or future bias (re￿ected in  p,1 <  p,2 and  p,1 <  p,3). 5 The estimate  ¯ for
the mean present-biasedness in the the population of latent estimates is small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero at the 5% level. When we estimate the model with a small subset of
data using the real-e￿ort version of the CTB, the mean latent e￿ect becomes large ( ¯ = 0.096)
and is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
5It is tempting to think that there are simply no latent studies in which the aggregate estimate of the present-bias
parameter indicates future bias, but in individual results for present bias, such as those provided by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012), a surprisingly large proportion of individuals do exhibit choices consistent with future bias, so it is
not unlikely that there are a large number of latent studies indicating aggregate future bias.
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T￿￿￿￿ C.8: Selection estimates.
Monetary
All “Neutral” All “Neutral” E￿ort
Mean latent e￿ect  ¯ 0.026 0.063 0.013 0.061 0.096
(0.040) (0.050) (0.051) (0.064) (0.016)
Pr[Report|Z< 1.96]
Pr[Report|Z>1.96]  p,1 0.259 0.741 0.229 0.896 0.000
(0.369) (1.154) (0.376) (1.577) (5.291)
Pr[Report| 1.96<Z<0]
Pr[Report|Z>1.96]  p,2 1.809 4.136 2.112 6.116 0.191
(1.432) (3.450) (1.847) (5.483) (0.201)
Pr[Report|0<Z<1.96]
Pr[Report|Z>1.96]  p,3 3.869 7.446 4.539 10.769 0.534
(2.243) (4.926) (2.797) (7.071) (0.460)
Mean PB 1    ¯ 0.974 0.937 0.987 0.939 0.904
Test of selective reporting H0 :  p,1 =  p,2 =  p,3 = 1 0.019 0.448 0.005 0.392 0.000
Test of a true e￿ect H0 :   = 0 0.511 0.206 0.804 0.342 0.000
Observations 217 160 193 140 24
Number of studies 29 27 20 19 9
Note: Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded. Z -values are de￿ned such that
estimates of the present bias parameter below one yield positive Z -values. Publication likelihood  p ’s are measured
relative to omitted category of positively signi￿cant (at 5% level) estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at study level.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.28: The original z-statistics and bias-corrected z-statistics.
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C.8 Stem-Based Bias Correction
Furukawa (2019) shows that a range of underlying processes—not just the biased preferences
of researchers and journal editors—could lead to publication bias, and proposes a “stem-based”
bias correction method for meta-analyses based on weaker assumptions regarding the selection
process for reported results.
This estimator uses the studies with the highest precision to estimate a bias-corrected average
e￿ect for the hypothetical population of latent studies, since the studies with high precision are
generally the least a￿ected by publication bias (since there is simply less variation in study results
for selection to occur on). The number of studies to include in the estimate is determined by min-
imizing the estimated mean squared error of the resulting estimator. In this way, this estimator
is a generalization of the method suggested by Stanley et al. (2010) whereby the most precise 10%
of all studies are averaged.
T￿￿￿￿ C.9: Stem-based correction.
Monetary
All “Neutral” All “Neutral” E￿ort
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
PB 0.9910 0.9992 0.9910 0.9992 0.9266
(0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0253)
Observations 217 160 193 140 24
Number of stems 56 55 56 55 7
% information used 0.4312 0.5118 0.4497 0.5405 0.4664
Note: Three observations with large in￿uence measure (|DFBETAS | > 1) are excluded. Column identi￿ers A-E
indicate the panels in Figure C.29.
The results show that, averaging over the most precise studies, the estimated present-bias
parameter is statistically di￿erent from one, indicating aggregate evidence of present bias (PB =
0.991; Table C.9 column 1, Figure C.29A). When restricting the sample to estimates without any
treatment variations, the estimated present bias parameter is indistinguishable from one (PB =
0.999; Figure C.29B). These results are consistent with the simplemeta-analytic average presented
in Table 5, columns (1) and (4).
Similar to the other meta-analytic methods we employ, Figure C.29E show that when only
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studies where subjects make decisions over allocations of e￿ort are included, there is signi￿cant
aggregate evidence of present bias (PB = 0.927), which is in stark contrast with monetary-reward
CTB (PB = 0.999).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.29: Stem-based estimates. Overly in￿uential (|DFBETAS | > 1) observations are excluded. (A) All
observations. (B) Neutral condition only. (C) Monetary-CTB, all observations. (D) Monetary-CTB, neutral
condition only. (E) E￿ort-CTB.
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C.9 P-Values of PB Estimates
We calculated p-values from the reported estimates and their associated standard errors since
not all articles reported the p-value from the test against the null hypothesis of “no present bias”
(H0 : PB = 1). The distribution of p-values are shown as a boxplot for each study and in empirical
CDFs split by the condition of the experiment (neutral or some treatment variation) in Figure C.30.
Just under 40% (84/220 = 0.38; 73 of them in the direction of present bias) of all the PB es-
timates are signi￿cantly di￿erent from one (Table C.10 in Online Appendix). The proportion of
estimates with p < 0.05 is higher in experiments with some treatment variation than in neutral
experiments, but the di￿erence in proportions is not large (50% in treatment and 34% in neutral;
two-sample z-test for proportion, p = 0.031). Note, however, that our classi￿cations of “treat-
ment” and “neutral” are made somewhat arbitrarily in some cases. 6 There are 16 studies that
reported at most three PB estimates (eight of them reported only one estimate) and 75% (12/16)
of them reported only signi￿cant estimate(s). Eight studies (out of 31) reported only insigni￿cant
result(s).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.30: P-values of present bias parameter estimates. The vertical dotted lines indicate the 5% sig-
ni￿cance level.
6Focusing on 84 signi￿cant (p < 0.05) estimates, we can make a p-curve introduced by Simonsohn et al. (2014)
to detect p-hacking (which will produce disproportionately many estimates just below the desired threshold such
as p < 0.05. The shape of the p-curve does not indicate evidence of aggressive p-hacking (Figures C.19 and C.20 in
Online Appendix).
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T￿￿￿￿ C.10: Re-calculaed p-values of PB estimates.
All Neutral Treatment
Freq. Prop. (%) Freq. Prop. (%) Freq. Prop. (%)
Total # estimates 220 100.0 162 100.0 58 100.0
PB < 1 170 77.3 121 74.7 49 84.5
with p < 0.05 73 42.9 45 37.2 28 57.1
PB   1 50 22.7 41 25.3 9 15.5
with p < 0.05 11 22.0 10 24.4 1 11.1
Note: Proportions of statistically signi￿cant PB estimates (p < 0.05) are conditional on either PB < 1 or PB   1
depending on the row.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.31: P-curves (signi￿cant estimates split by the treatment type). (A) All observations. (B) Treat-
ment type.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.32: P-curves (signi￿cant estimates split by the reward type). (A) Monetary-CTB. (B) E￿ort-CTB.
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